Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in neutral populations by Szolnoki, Attila & Perc, Matjaž
           
PAPER • OPEN ACCESS
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in neutral
populations
To cite this article: Attila Szolnoki and Matjaž Perc 2018 New J. Phys. 20 013031
 
View the article online for updates and enhancements.
Recent citations
Enhancement of cooperation by giving
high-degree neighbors more help
Han-Xin Yang and Zhi-Xi Wu
-
Coevolutionary dynamics of aspiration and
strategy in spatial repeated public goods
games
Te Wu et al
-
How mutation alters the evolutionary
dynamics of cooperation on networks
Genki Ichinose et al
-
This content was downloaded from IP address 148.6.78.61 on 04/07/2018 at 11:43
New J. Phys. 20 (2018) 013031 https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/aa9fd2
PAPER
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in neutral populations
Attila Szolnoki1 andMatjažPerc2,3,4,5
1 Institute of Technical Physics andMaterials Science, Centre for Energy Research,Hungarian Academy of Sciences, POBox 49,H-1525
Budapest, Hungary
2 Faculty ofNatural Sciences andMathematics, University ofMaribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000Maribor, Slovenia
3 CAMTP—Center for AppliedMathematics andTheoretical Physics, University ofMaribor, Krekova 2, SI-2000Maribor, Slovenia
4 Complexity ScienceHub, Josefstädterstraße 39, A-1080Vienna, Austria
5 Author towhomany correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail: szolnoki.attila@energia.mta.hu andmatjaz.perc@uni-mb.si
Keywords: cooperation, pattern formation, cyclic dominance, neutral populations, social dilemma
Abstract
Cooperation is a difﬁcult proposition in the face ofDarwinian selection. Those that defect have an
evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out.However, spatial structure
enables cooperators to survive through the formation of homogeneous clusters, which is the hallmark
of network reciprocity. Herewe go beyond this traditional setup and study the spatiotemporal
dynamics of cooperation in a population of populations.We use the prisonerʼs dilemma game as the
mathematicalmodel and show that considering several populations simultaneously gives rise to
fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics and pattern formation. Even the simplest assumption that
strategies between different populations are payoff-neutral with one another results in the
spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, where defectors of one population become prey of
cooperators in the other population, and vice versa.Moreover, if social interactions within different
populations are characterized by signiﬁcantly different temptations to defect, we observe that
defectors in the populationwith the largest temptation counterintuitively vanish the fastest, while
cooperators that hang on eventually take over thewhole available space. Our results reveal that
considering the simultaneous presence of different populations signiﬁcantly expands the complexity
of evolutionary dynamics in structured populations, and it allows us to understand the stability of
cooperation under adverse conditions that could never be bridged by network reciprocity alone.
1. Introduction
Methods of statistical physics, in particularMonte Carlo simulations and the theory of phase transitions [1–3],
have been successfully applied to a rich plethora of challenging problems in the social sciences [4–7]. The
evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas—situationswherewhat is best for the society is at oddswithwhat is
best for an individual—is a vibrant example of this development.Many reviews [8–11] and research papers that
reveal keymechanisms for socially preferable evolutionary outcomes have been published in recent years
[12–26]. Since cooperative behaviour is central to the survival ofmany animal species, and since it is also at the
heart of the remarkable evolutionary success story of humans [27, 28], it is one of the great challenges of the 21st
century that we succeed in understanding howbest to sustain and promote cooperation [29].
It has been shown that phase transitions leading to cooperation depend sensitively on the structure of the
interaction network and the type of interactions [30–34], as well as on the number and type of competing
strategies [8, 35–37]. An important impetus for the application of statistical physics to evolutionary social
dilemmas and cooperation has been the seminal discovery ofNowak andMay [38], who showed that spatial
structure can promote the evolution of cooperation through themechanism that is nowwidely referred to as
network reciprocity [39, 40]. A good decade latter Santos and Pacheco have shown just how important the
structure of the interaction network can be [13], which paved theway further towards aﬂourishing development
of thisﬁeld of research.
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Butwhile research concerning the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in structured populations has
come a longway,models where different populations do not interact directly but compete for space at the level
of individuals have not been considered before.Motivated by this, we consider a systemwhere two ormore
populations are distributed randomly on a commonphysical space. Between themembers of a particular
population the interactions are described by the prisonerʼs dilemma game. But there are no such interactions
between players belonging to different populations, and hence players are unable to collect payoffs from
neighbours belonging to a different population. The populations on the same physics space, for example on a
square lattice, are thus neutral. Nevertheless, all players compete for space regardless towhich population they
belong, so that a player with a higherﬁtness is likely to invade a neighbouring player with a lowerﬁtness.
Aswewill show, such a conglomerate of otherwise neutral populations gives rise to fascinating
spatiotemporal dynamics and pattern formation that is rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cyclic
dominance.Within a very simplemodel, we observe the survival of cooperators under extremely adverse
conditionswhere traditional network reciprocity would long fail, andwe observe the dominance of theweakest
due to the greediness of the strongest when considering different temptations to defect in different populations.
Inwhat follows, weﬁrst present the studied prisonerʼs dilemma game and the details of themathematical
model.We then proceedwith the presentation of themain results and a discussions of their wider implications.
2. Prisonerʼs dilemma in neutral populations
As the backbone of ourmathematicalmodel, we use a simpliﬁed version of the prisonerʼs dilemma game, where
the key aspects of this social dilemma are preservedwhile its strength is determined by a single parameter [38]. In
particular,mutual cooperation yields the rewardR=1,mutual defection leads to punishmentP=0, while the
mixed choice gives the cooperator the suckerʼs payoff S=0 and the defector the temptationT 1> .We note
that the selection of this widely used and representative parameterization gives results that remain valid in a
broad range of pairwise social dilemmas, including the snowdrift and the stag-hunt game.
All players occupy the nodes of a L×L square lattice with four neighbours each. To introduce the
simultaneous presence of different populations, the L2 players are assigned to i n1, 2, ,= ¼ different
populations uniformly at random.All i populations contain an equal fraction ofCi cooperators andDi defectors,
who upon pairwise interactions receive payoffs in agreementwith the above-described prisonerʼs dilemma
game. Importantly, between different populations players are payoff-neutral with one another, whichmeans
thatwhenCimeetsCj orDj, its payoff does not change, and vice versa. In the next subsection, weﬁrst consider
themodel where all populations have the same temptation to defect (T Ti = for all i), and thenwe relax this
condition to allow different temptations to defect in different populations.
We use theMonte Carlo simulationmethod to determine the spatiotemporal dynamics of themathematical
model, which comprises the following elementary steps. First, a randomly selected player x acquires its payoff xP
by playing the game potentially with all its four neighbours. Next, player x randomly chooses one neighbour y,
who then also acquires its payoff yP in the sameway as previously player x. Finally, player x imitates the strategy
of player ywith the probability w K1 exp x y 1= + P - P -{ (( ) )} , wherewe use K 0.1= as the inverse of the
temperature of selection to obtain results comparable with existing research [8]. Naturally, when neighbouring
players compete for space then the above describemicroscopic dynamics involves not only the adoption ofmore
successful strategy but also the imitation of the involved population tag.
In agreement with the random sequential simulation procedure, during a fullMonte Carlo step (MCS) each
player obtains a chance once on average to imitate a neighbour. The average fractions of allmicroscopic states on
the square lattice are determined in the stationary state after a sufﬁciently long relaxation time. Depending on
the proximity to phase transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial patterns, the linear system size
was varied from L=400 to 6600, and the relaxation timewas varied from104–106MCS to ensure that the
statistical error is comparable with the size of the symbols in the ﬁgures.
3. Results
Naively, onemight assume that introducing several populations simultaneously which bear the same serious
conﬂict of competing strategiesmight not bring about any changes in the evolutionary outcome. As is well
known, theNash equilibriumof the prisonerʼs dilemma game ismutual defection [41], and since this applies to
all populations, the overall outcome should bemutual defection too. This reasoning is actually completely
correct inwell-mixed populations, where the consideration of different, otherwise neutral populations really
does not change the result: cooperators die out in all populations as soon asT 1> . But as wewill shownext, this
naive expectation is completely wrong in structured populations, where excitingly different evolutionary
outcomes can be observe due to the simultaneous presence of different populations.
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As far as cooperation promotion is concerned, and before elucidating the responsiblemicroscopic
mechanism for such favourable evolutionary outcomes, we show in ﬁgure 1 how the fraction of cooperators
changes in dependence on the temptation to defectT for different numbers of populations n that form the global
system. For comparison, we also show the baseline n=1 case, which corresponds to the traditional version of
theweak prisonerʼs dilemma game on the square lattice, andwhere cooperators beneﬁt fromnetwork
reciprocity to survive up toT 1.037 [43]. It can be observed that, as we increase n, the fraction of cooperators
increases dramatically. In fact, the higher the value of n, the higher the stationary fraction of cooperators in the
whole system.
The spatiotemporal dynamics behind this promotion of cooperation in a complex system consisting of two
populations can be seen in the animation provided in [42], while a representative snapshot of the stationary state
is shown inﬁgure 2. In both cases cooperators are depicted bluewhile defectors are depicted red, and different
shades of these two colours denote adherence to the two different populations. Inﬁgure 2, we have circled two
crucial details that explain how the patterns evolve over time. Thewhite circlemarked ‘I’ highlights that dark red
defectors can easily invade dark blue cooperators. However, the invaded space is quickly lost to light blue
cooperators belonging to the other population. The latter, on the other hand, are successfully invaded by light
red defectors from their own population, who are in turn again invaded by dark blue cooperators. In this way the
loop is closed, revealing the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance in the form
D C D C D1 1 2 2 1    , which determines the stationary distribution of strategies in our system. As is
well-known, the cyclic dominance is crucial for themaintenance of biodiversity [36], which in our case translates
to the survival of all four competing strategies, and thus to the sustenance of cooperation even at very high
temptation values.
This cyclic dominance can be observed directly if we launch the evolution from a prepared initial state, such
that homogeneous domains of the competing strategies are separated by straight interfaces, as in the animation
provided in [44] (in this animation a higherT 1.5= temptation to defect was used to yield clearer propagating
fronts). It can be observed that conceptually similar propagating fronts emerge aswere observed before in rock-
paper-scissors-like systems [36].
Turning back toﬁgure 2, thewhite ellipsemarked ‘II’highlights another important aspect of the
spatiotemporal dynamics, namely the smooth interface separating the two cooperative strategies in the absence
of defectors. Thismay be surprising atﬁrst because these strategies are payoff-neutral, and thus a voter-model-
like coarseningwith highlyﬂuctuating interfaces would be expected [45]. Indeed, while aC1 cooperator does not
beneﬁt from the vicinity of aC2 cooperator, otherC1 cooperators close by of course increase each otherʼs payoffs
(and vice versa forC2 cooperators). As a consequence of this the payoffs ofC1 andC2 cooperators along the
interface differ, so that onewill likely invade the other. This process always aims to straighten the interfaces. If an
interface cannot be straightened, for example around a small island, the latter will shrink due to an effective
surface tension.
Lastly in terms of the results presented inﬁgure 1, it remains to explainwhy the larger the number of
populations forming the global system the higher the level of cooperation in the stationary state, and this
Figure 1.The stationary fC fraction of cooperators in thewhole system in dependence on the temptation to defectT, as obtained for
different numbers of populations n that form the global system (indicated by the number along each curve). For reference the result of
the classic one-population (n=1) spatial prisonerʼs dilemma game is shown aswell. These results indicate that the introduction of
additional populations whosemembers are payoff-neutral between one another signiﬁcantly improves the survival chances of
cooperators.
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regardless of the temptation to defect. To that effect we provide in [46] an animation showing the spatiotemporal
dynamics when n=3, and inﬁgure 3 a representative snapshot of the distribution of strategies on the square
lattice in the stationary state. These results reveal that the increasing positive effect is due to the fact that the
addition of one newpopulation i always yields one additional prey to the cooperators in other populations. At
the same time, no newpredators to them are introduced, i.e.Di defectors who act as the prey to cooperators in
the other populations are predators only toCi cooperators, but the latterﬁnd their prey in defectors fromother
populations too. The snapshot inﬁgure 3 features twowhite ellipses, where it is highlighted that the plain redD3
defectors are dominated by bothC1 (dark blue) andC2 (light blue) cooperators (see also the animation in [46]).
Thus far, we have only considered cases where the temptation to defect was the same in all populations. By
relaxing this restriction, the number of free parameters increases signiﬁcantly, yet it is still possible to determine
general properties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that governs the evolutionary outcomes in a presented
system.
We begin by presenting results for the generalized two-population setupwhereT T1 2¹ . Aswe have shown
above, the emergence of cyclic dynamics between the four competingmicroscopic states in general dictates a
stable coexistence. By increasing the temptation to defect in one population practically increases the rate in the
corresponding D C invasion. The consequences of this fact, based on the fundamental principles of cyclic
dominance [36], actually completely explain the evolutionary outcomes inﬁgure 4. Theﬁrst potentially
surprising observation is that increasing the temptation to defectT2 betweenD2 defectors andC2 cooperators
will not only lower the stationary fraction ofC2 and increase the stationary fraction ofD2, but also elevate the
fraction ofC1 cooperators. This is becauseD2 defectors are prey toC1 cooperators, and it is well-known that a
species entailed in cyclic dominance is promoted not byweakening its predator, but rather bymaking its prey
stronger. This paradox is a frequently observed trademark of systems that are governed by cyclic dominance
[47]. However, despite the described boost to the growth ofC1 cooperators, the overall fraction of all cooperators
in thewhole systemdecreases slightly as we increaseT2 towards very large values, as illustrated in the inset of
ﬁgure 4.
For a better demonstration of the acceleration of the D C2 2 invasion and the resulting boost toC1
cooperators (dark blue), we provide an animation in [48], where an extreme highT 1002 = was used at L=400
linear system size. As the animation shows, althoughC2 cooperators (light blue) are invaded very efﬁciently by
Figure 2. Snapshot of the distribution of strategies in the stationary state in a system consisting of two populations. In both population
the temptation to defect is T 1.2= . Defectors belonging to theﬁrst population are depicted dark red, while cooperators of theﬁrst
population are depicted dark blue. Similarly, cooperators and defectors of the second population are depicted light blue and light red,
respectively. The keymechanism that is responsible for the emerging spatial pattern is highlighted by awhite circlemarked ‘I’.
Together with the animation provided in [42], it can be observed that dark red defectors invade dark blue cooperators, but light blue
cooperators invade dark red defectors. Likewise, light red defectors invade light blue cooperators, but dark blue cooperators invade
light red defectors. This spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance in the form D C D C D1 1 2 2 1    is responsible for the
sustenance of cooperation even at very high temptation values that can be observed inﬁgure 1. Thewhite ellipsemarked ‘II’highlights
the smooth interface between both cooperator strategies in the absence of defectors, which is surprising given that the two strategies
are payoff-neutral and thus should be subject to voter-model-like coarsening. For clarity a L=400 linear system sizewas used.
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D2 defectors (light red), the abundance ofD1 defectors (dark red) always offers an evolutionary escape hatch out
of extinction ofC2 cooperators. In agreement with the above described cyclic dominance,D2 defectors are fast
invaded byC1 cooperators. Interestingly,D1 defectors would also beatC1 cooperators becauseT 1.051 = is above
theT 1.037= cooperation survival threshold of a single population, yet the D C2 2 propagating front always
comes to the rescue, bringingwith itD2 defectors as prey.
In comparison to the results obtainedwhen the temptation to defect is the same in all populations (see
ﬁgure 1), itmay come as a surprise that cooperators die out ifT 2.85> , and this despite the fact that qualitatively
the same cyclic dominance emerges there. The explanation of this difference illustrated inﬁgure 4 is that in the
symmetrical case the D C1 2 and D C2 2 invasion rates change simultaneously aswe varyT. However, it is
precisely this simultaneous change of invasion rates thatmay jeopardize the stable coexistence inmodels of
cyclic dominance. As shownpreviously for a symmetric 4-strategy Lotka–Volterra system, the coexistence
Figure 3. Snapshot of the distribution of strategies in the stationary state in a system consisting of three populations. In all three
population the temptation to defect is T 1.2= . As inﬁgure 2, different shades of blue and red depict cooperators and defector
belonging to different populations.White ellipses highlight that plain red defectors are successfully invaded by both light blue and
dark blue cooperators that belong to the other two populations.
Figure 4.The stationary fractions of the four competing strategies in dependence on the temptation to defectT2, as obtained for
n=2. The temptation to defect for theﬁrst population is T 1.051 = . The inset shows the overall fraction of cooperators in the system
in the largeT2 limit.
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disappears if the difference between the invasion rates exceeds a threshold value [49]. For an illustration, the
effective food-web of the four competing strategies in a two-populationmodel is shown in left panel ofﬁgure 5.
Naturally, if we allow different temptation values in different populations the behaviour becomes evenmore
complex, as we shownext using still a relatively simple three-population system as an example. The effective
food-web is shown in the right panel ofﬁgure 5. If we just varyT3, while the temptation to defect in the other two
populations remainsﬁxed atT T 1.051 2= = , the D C3 3 invasion ratewill inﬂuence invasions in several other
cycles in the effective food-web. Examples include the D C D C D3 3 1 1 3    cycle, or the
D C D C D3 3 2 2 3    cycle, or the D C D C D C D3 3 1 1 2 2 3      cycle, all of which
contain the elementary D C3 3 invasion that is directly affected byT3. This is why it is almost impossible to
predict the response of a system comprised of several neutral populations, even if only a single temptation to
defect is varied.
For the above n=3 case, the results showing howdifferentT3 values affect the evolutionary outcome are
presented inﬁgure 6. It can be observed that upon increasing the value ofT3, the stationary fraction ofC1 andC2
cooperators is not affected, even though they are the predators ofD3 who should in principle be promoted by
largeT3 values. On the other hand, the overall fraction of all defectors in the system remains very low. But the
most exotic reaction is that of the fraction ofC3 cooperators, which is of course the direct prey ofD3 defectors.
While initially their fraction in the stationary state decreases to a shallowminimumacross the intermediate
range ofT3 values, it ultimately increases to complete dominance above a threshold value. In other words, while
defectors survive when allT values in the system are equal to 1.05, they die out if we increase one of them
sufﬁciently, as it happens inﬁgure 6when theT3 value is sufﬁciently large. Due to the symmetry of themodel the
same results are of course obtained if either the value ofT1 orT2 would be enlarged instead of the value ofT3.
To better understand and illustrate the seemingly paradoxical effect the increasingT3 value has on the
evolutionary outcome, we provide an animation from a prepared initial state in [50]. Here the square lattice is
horizontally divided into two parts, where in the top halfC1 cooperators (dark blue) are framed byD1 defectors
Figure 5.The effective food-web of all competing strategies in a two- (left) and three-population (right panel) system.We emphasize
that the depicted relations between strategies exist only in a spatial system,where cooperators can invade defectors fromother
populations. If we consider solely pairwise interactions, the relation betweenC1 cooperators andD2 defectors (orC1 andC2) is of
course payoff-neutral, as deﬁned in themathematicalmodel.
Figure 6.The stationary fractions of the six competing strategies in dependence on the temptation to defectT3, as obtained for n=3.
The temptation to defect for theﬁrst and second population is T T 1.051 2= = . The inset shows the fraction ofD3 defectors in
dependence onT3. Counterintuitively, although largerT3 values directly support D C3 3 invasions, the fraction ofD3 defectors
decreases steadily as the value ofT3 increases.
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(dark red), while in the bottomhalfC3 cooperators (plane blue) are framed byD3 defectors (plain red).
Moreover, both D C D– – patches are surrounded byC2 cooperators (light blue). The applied temptation to
defect values areT T 1.051 2= = andT 1.83 = . Importantly, invasions through the horizontal border are not
permitted becausewewant to compare the independent evolution of both sub-systems. SinceD2 defectors are
not present,C2 cooperators have no natural predator. As a consequence, thewhole systemwill evolve into a pure
C2 (light blue)phase. However, the really interesting aspect of this animation is how thementioned sub-systems
reach this state. In the top half,D1 defectors are less aggressive, and therefore their invasions are less salient. This
has two important consequences. In the ﬁrst place, their payoffs are not that high for the other strategies to
imitate them, and so the C D1 1– border isﬂuctuating rather strongly. Secondly,D1 defectors do not form a
homogeneous front along this border. The latter would be essential for a fast invasion ofC2 cooperators (light
blue), who are their predators. In otherwords, the effective invasion ofC2 cooperators can only happen via the
invasion ofD1 defectors. The latter conditions is completely fulﬁlled in the bottomhalf whereD3 defectors are
more aggressive. Here defectors formnot just amore compact invasion front, but they also form a thick,
uniform stripe, which is an easy target forC2 cooperators. Consequently, themore aggressive defectors will die
outmuch faster than their less potentD1 counterparts in the top half of the square lattice.
This process just described is actually very commonwhen the value of the temptation to defect in one
population is signiﬁcantly larger than the corresponding values in other populations. Of course, the extinction of
themost aggressive defector frequently involves also the extinction of its cooperator prey. Sometimes, however,
if the system size is large enough, itmay happen that the prey of themore aggressive defectorsmanages to
separate itself in an isolated part of the lattice and hang on until his predators die out. Such a situation is
illustrated inﬁgure 7, where thewhite ellipses and circlesmark plain blue cooperator spotswho got rid of their
natural predators (plain red). In the absence of the latter, the arguably weakest cooperators become the
strongest, and they eventually rise to complete dominance by invading defectors from the other two populations
who themselves continuously invade their cooperators. Thewhole evolutionary process can be seen in the
animation in [51], wherewe have used prepared initial patches of the six competing strategies tomake the
spatiotemporal dynamics that leads to the described pattern formation better visible. Additionally, for a faster
evolution, we have used a smaller L=180 linear system size. In effect, the plain blue cooperators use the
defectors from the other two populations as a Trojan horse to invade thewhole available space. And despite of
starting as theweakest, they turn out to be the dominant due to the greediness of their direct predators.
Figure 7. Snapshot of the distribution of strategies during an early stage of evolution in a system consisting of three populations.
Values of the temptation to defect are T 1.83 = and T T 1.051 2= = . As inﬁgures 2 and 3, different shades of blue and red depict
cooperators and defector belonging to different populations.White ellipses highlight theweakestC3 cooperators (plane blue), who
manage to survive despite the largeT3 value giving a huge evolutionary advantage to their direct predatorsD3 (plain red).What is
more, due to their greediness,D3 defectors are actually theﬁrst to die out, thus paving theway forC3 cooperators to rise to complete
dominance by usingD1 andD2 defectors (light and dark red) as a Trojan horse to invade the territory ofC1 andC2 cooperators (light
and dark blue). This is an example where the weakest ultimately dominate because of the greediness of the strongest. For clarity a
L=360 linear system sizewas used.
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4.Discussion
Wehave studied the spatiotemporal dynamics of cooperation in a systemwhere several neutral populations are
simultaneously present. The evolutionary prisonerʼs dilemma game has been used as the backbone of our
mathematicalmodel, wherewe have assumed that strategies between the populations are payoff-neutral but
competing freely with one another as determined by the interaction graph topology.Within a particular
population the classical deﬁnition of the prisonerʼs dilemma game between cooperators and defectors has been
applied.We have observed fascinating spatiotemporal dynamics and pattern formation that is unattainable in a
single population setup. From the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance to the survival of theweakest due
to the greediness of the strongest, our results have revealed that the simultaneous presence of neutral
populations signiﬁcantly expands the complexity of evolutionary dynamics in structured populations. From the
practical point of view, cooperation in the proposed setup is strongly promoted and remains viable even under
extremely adverse conditions that could never be bridged by network reciprocity alone. The consideration of
simultaneously present neutral populations thus allows us to understand the extreme persistence and stability of
cooperationwithout invoking strategic complexity, and indeed in the simplest possible terms as far as
population structure and overall complexity of themathematicalmodel is concerned.
The central observation behind the promotion of cooperation is that, if we put two payoff-neutral
populations together, then only cooperators can beneﬁt from it in the long run.While the advantage ofmutual
cooperation is readily recognizable already in a single population, and it is in fact themain driving force behind
traditional network reciprocity, the extend of it remains limited because cooperators at the frontier with
defectors always remain vulnerable to invasion. This danger is here elegantly avoidedwhen a cooperative cluster
meets with the defectors of the other population. In the latter case the positive consequence of network
reciprocity is augmented and cooperators can easily invade the territory of the foreign defectors. Importantly,
this evolutionary success of cooperators in one populationworks vice versa for cooperators in the other
population(s) too. Due to this symmetry, it is easy to understand that, as we have shown, the larger the number of
populations forming the system, themore effective the promotion of cooperation.
We have also shown that the alreadymentioned positive impact can be enhanced further if we allowdifferent
temptations to defect in different populations. Counterintuitively, in a systemwhere the population speciﬁc
temptation to defect values are diverse enough, defectors die outﬁrst whose temptation value is the largest. And
this turns out to be detrimental for defectors in other populations too. An extreme aggressive invasion namely
leads to the fast depletion of the prey—in this case the cooperators from the corresponding population—which
in turn leads to the extinction of the predators. However, the reverse situation is not valid: if themost vulnerable
cooperators somehowmanage to survive, they eventually rise to complete dominance, using defectors from
other populations as Trojan horses to invade cooperators fromother populations. This gives rise to the
dominance of theweakest due to the greediness of the strongest, and it also reminds us that dynamical processes
in different populations should not be too diverse because this jeopardizes the stability of thewhole system.
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